

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400150002-1

Washington, D.C. 20505

29 September 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, USN (Ret.)
Director of Policy Review
Office of the Secretary of Defense

John N. McMahon
Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for the National/Tactical
Interface Study

1. I've read the Terms of Reference for the National/Tactical Interface Study, and the attached paper on "The Nature of National/Tactical Interface." I'd like to express my keen interest in this study and offer to participate enough to be of assistance but not interference with the progress of it.
2. To begin with, I'd appreciate knowing who is actually going to be doing the work of the study.
3. I was concerned with paragraph 6c. of the Terms of Reference. It seems to me you could read 6c.(1) to say the study should be developing tactical concepts of employing tactical intelligence systems. It seems to me that is beyond the bounds of the study and properly a matter for the Department of Defense. Similarly, paragraph 6c.(2) talks about determining requirements for tactical intelligence which seems to be beyond the scope of this interface issue.
4. Basically, my concerns are that the study cover two points:
 - a. How we insure that the tactical spilloff from national collection systems is made available to the proper tactical commanders.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Classified by Signer
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)

Automatically declassified on

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400150002-1

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400150002-1

b. How we conduct some review in the budget process to insure that there is not undue duplication between national and tactical systems.

5. With respect to the first point above, it seems to me that the issue is quite simple. The NITC tasks all national systems, but tactical commanders are free to provide advisory tasking or request tasking which the NITC will have to adjudicate; on the other hand, the tactical systems are tasked by tactical commanders, but the Director, NITC, may provide request or advisory tasking which the tactical commanders adjudicate. I am still strongly of the opinion, despite all the advice I am receiving contrariwise, that it would be desirable for the Director, NITC, to allocate a portion of the tasking of the overhead systems to the major unified commanders on a daily basis. Even though the unified commanders now make a strong input to this tasking, I believe we should make them feel responsible for tasking to meet their most urgent needs. Only if we in fact give them a "hand on the wheel" will they begin to believe that the national systems are and will be responsive to their tactical needs. In short, if Generals Haig/Huyser have 25% of a satellite's time when in their geographical zone, they will begin to feel the utility of having that vehicle and be prepared for the day when the readout of it will go direct to them. The NITC could program the other 75% working around the requirements of the 25% levied by CINCEUR, e.g., subtracting overlaps from national and tactical requirements.

6. On the reverse question of national advisory tasking of tactical systems, it seems to me this can be worked out between the NITC and the CCF. The CCF should be keeping the NITC posted at all times as to what tactical systems are being employed at a given time; the NITC should be alert to see where that tasking could possibly pick up national requirements and so advise the CCF.

7. On the budgetary issues, it seems to me the new decision units that we are instituting in our budget process should be a big help, at least if Defense is using the same units as the NFIP. I believe that the IC Staff could take responsibility for checking within decision units of the IRA and the NFIP as to where there is competition and then proposing and promoting a review to see whether consolidation is feasible.

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400150002-1

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400150002-1

8. Additionally, I think we should make provision that the Strategy/Planning Staff of the NITC should be required to take into account the potential contribution of tactical systems when drawing up overall collection strategies.

9. I've made a tick on your milestone charts for the points at which I would like to receive copies of the progress reports. I appreciate the real effort that's going into this key project.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Stansfield Turner', with a stylized, sweeping flourish at the end.

STANSFIELD TURNER

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400150002-1

SECRET

30 SEP 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

Attached is an interesting letter I received from a professor

STAT

[redacted] who is a Micronesian-Melanesian expert.

I'd be interested, on a no-rush basis, to know who is our Papua-New Guinea expert and to get a short memo on what the situation is out there. [redacted]

STAT

STAT

[redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400150002-1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400150002-1

29 SEP 1977

NOTE FOR: General Counsel

Tony:

When I reviewed your draft letter of apology on the mail opening, I did not have available the original draft from Justice that was published in the newspapers. My primary concerns in this endeavor are:

- (1) To write a letter that is entirely different from the one which was improperly published in the press;
- (2) To make my letter warmer and less bureaucratic than that one;
- (3) To emphasize the historical nature of these operations by citing the specific years since this has been happening in each case.


STANSFIELD TURNER

25X1

D R A F T

TO:

[Redacted]

Dear _____:

On behalf of the United States Government and of the Central Intelligence Agency within that Government, I wish to express my apologies to you for the past invasion of your rights of privacy through mail opening activities that took place _____ - _____ years ago. I can assure you that at the time these mail opening activities took place there was a substantial basis for thinking that they were being performed under legal authorities. Judge Weinstein has, of course, ruled that such legal authorities did not exist; whether there will be additional litigation on this issue remains to be seen. As you would understand, it would be imprudent of me to comment on the legalities of this situation when it could well impact on a number of additional law suits which are currently pending against the United States.

I do want to assure you, however, that CIA is not today opening mail in U.S. postal channels and has not for some years. There is not only no intent to do so again, but there are specific regulations prohibiting this and measures to ensure full compliance with those regulations.

Again, let me express my regret at the intrusion into your privacy and to assure you that the CIA, as well as all of the intelligence activities of our country, are pointed toward defending the rights and the freedoms of American citizens.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER